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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] One of the most innovative provisions in the newly-effective 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure addressing electronic 
discovery may be the creation of a two-tier system for the discovery of 
electronically stored information, under new Rule 26(b)(2)(B).1  This rule 
states that “[a] party need not provide discovery” of such information 
“from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible 
because of undue burden or cost.”2  This provision offers litigants the 
opportunity to work toward agreement, rather than impasse, in defining 
                                                 
* The author is an Assistant Director in the Federal Programs Branch of the Civil 
Division of the United States Department of Justice.  The views expressed herein are 
solely those of the author and should not be taken to represent the views of the 
Department of Justice. 
1
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).  The Supreme Court Order, in addition to the Rule itself, 
can be found in the Supreme Court’s April 12, 2006 transmittal to Congress, Amendments 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Communication from the Chief Justice, The 
Supreme Court of the United States, transmitting Amendments of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure that have been adopted by the Court, Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2072, 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv06p.pdf, [hereinafter April 
Transmittal].  The Committee Note to the amended rule can be found at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EDiscovery_w_Notes.pdf [hereinafter Committee Note]. 
2
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).   
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the scope of discovery for the various sources of electronically stored 
information potentially discoverable in their case.  In theory, the parties 
can agree that discovery of electronically stored information will be 
derived from sources that are reasonably accessible to the producing party 
(the first tier) but not from sources that are not reasonably accessible (the 
second tier).3  At the very least, the responding party’s invocation of the 
Rule should define more clearly the dispute between the parties as to 
which specific sources of information should be searched and produced.  
Thus, if the parties reach an impasse concerning the discovery of the 
second tier of information sources, the district court has the opportunity to 
resolve the dispute by applying the Rule and the guidance provided in the 
Committee Note. 
 
[2] Part I of this article describes Rule 26(b)(2)(B) and describes how the 
Civil Rules Advisory Committee (“Committee”) expected its two-tier 
feature to operate.4  Part II describes the Rule’s practical implications.  
Finally, Part III suggests how practitioners can use the new Rule 
effectively, whether they are making discovery demands or responding to 
those demands. 
 
II.  RULE 26(B)(2)(B) IN THEORY 
   
[3] While crafting the electronic discovery amendments, which became 
effective on December 1, 2006,5 the Civil Rules Advisory Committee took 
                                                 
3
 Daniel B. Garrie, Matthew J. Armstrong & Bill Burdett, Hiding the Inaccessible Truth: 
Amending the Federal Rules to Accommodate Electronic Discovery, 25 REV. LITIG. 115, 
116-18 (2006). 
4
 The federal judicial rulemaking process is set forth in the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2071-72.  Under that process, advisory committees, such as the Civil Rules Advisory 
Committee, develop proposed rules, which are submitted for review and approval to the 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (the so-called “Standing Committee”). 
The Standing Committee in turn makes recommendations to the Judicial Conference.  
The Conference submits proposed Rules changes to the Supreme Court.  If the Court 
approves them, the changes are submitted to Congress; such changes take effect unless 
Congress enacts legislation to reject, modify or defer the Rules.  See James C. Duff, The 
Rulemaking Process: A Summary for the Bench and Bar, FEDERAL RULEMAKING, Apr. 
2006, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/proceduresum.htm. 
5
 The Supreme Court’s April 12, 2006 Order states that the new Rules “shall take effect 
on December 1, 2006, and shall govern in all proceedings thereafter commenced and, 
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notice of the “difficulties in locating, retrieving, and providing discovery 
of some electronically stored information.”6  It recognized that electronic 
storage systems “often make it easier to locate and retrieve information” 
and that “[t]hese advantages are properly taken into account in 
determining the reasonable scope of discovery in a particular case.”7  The 
Committee added that “some sources of electronically stored information 
can be accessed only with substantial burden and cost.  In a particular 
case, these burdens and costs may make the information on such sources 
not reasonably accessible.”8  The Committee thus recognized the existence 
of a range of information sources with varying levels of accessibility.  The 
storage of information in electronic format, in some situations, could 
“provide ready access to information used in regular ongoing activities,” 
and information systems also “may be designed so as to provide ready 
access to information that is not regularly used.”9  At the same time, 
however, the Committee observed that such information systems “may 
retain information on sources that are accessible only by incurring 
substantial burdens or costs.”10  The Rule thus reflects an implicit premise 
by the Committee that private and public organizations collect and retain 
electronically stored information in a variety of sources with different 
levels of ease or difficulty in accessing, retrieving, or producing such 
information.  
  
[4] The Rule also reflects a second premise by the Committee, which is 
explained in the Committee Note, that “the volume of – and the ability to 
search – much electronically stored information means that in many cases 
the responding party will be able to produce information from reasonably 
accessible sources that will fully satisfy the parties’ discovery needs.”11  
The Committee Note then explains that “[i]n many circumstances the 
requesting party should obtain and evaluate the information from such 
                                                                                                                         
insofar as just and practicable, all proceedings then pending.”  April Transmittal, supra 
note 1, at 3. 
6
 Committee Note, supra note 1, at 13. 
7
 Id. 
8
 Id. 
9
 Id.  
10
 Id. 
11
 Id. at 14. 
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sources before insisting that the responding party search and produce 
information contained on sources that are not reasonably accessible.”12 
  
[5] New Rule 26(b)(2)(B) states that “[a] party need not provide discovery 
of electronically stored information from sources that the party identifies 
as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.”13  The Rule 
does not purport to define or describe what sources of information are 
reasonably accessible, and which are not.  The Committee Note implicitly 
recognizes that such a definition would be impractical, stating, “[i]t is not 
possible to define in a rule the different types of technological features that 
may affect the burdens and costs of accessing electronically stored 
information.”14 That statement reflects the Committee’s conclusion that 
the difficulties in accessing electronic information “may arise from a 
number of different reasons primarily related to the technology of 
information storage, reasons that are likely to change over time.”15  In 
                                                 
12
 Id. 
13
 FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
14
 Committee Note, supra note 1, at 13. 
15
 See Memorandum from Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Advisory Committee on 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to Honorable David F. Levi, Chair, Standing 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 34, (May 27, 2005),  available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supct1105/Excerpt_CV_Report.pdf [hereinafter May 2005 
Memorandum].  In that memorandum, the Civil Rules Committee transmitted the 
proposed Rules amendments to the Standing Committee.  It gave several examples of 
“difficult-to-access” sources: 
Examples from current technology include back-up tapes intended for 
disaster recovery purposes that are often not indexed, organized, or 
susceptible to electronic searching; legacy data that remains from 
obsolete systems and is unintelligible on the successor systems data 
that was “deleted” but remains in fragmented form, requiring a modern 
version of forensics to restore and retrieve; and databases that were 
designed to create certain information in certain ways and that cannot 
readily create very different kinds or forms of information.   
Id. at 34.  In its September 2005 Report to the Chief Justice and to the Judicial 
Conference, the Standing Committee provided a similar description to such sources.  
Excerpt from THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, COMMITTEE ON RULES ON 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 11, (2005), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supct1105/Excerpt_STReport_CV.pdf (“Examples under 
current technology include deleted information, information kept on some backup-tape 
systems for disaster recovery purposes, and legacy data remaining from systems no 
longer in use”). 
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addition, the Committee may have assumed that practitioners can address 
that problem without needing more specific guidance.16 
 
[6] Although the Rule does not specify the kinds of sources of 
electronically stored information that might not be reasonably accessible 
in litigation, it will be the responsibility of the responding party to produce 
the electronically stored information that is relevant and reasonably 
accessible and articulate what sources of information it does not intend to 
search or produce.  The Committee Note explains that the responding 
party “must . . . identify, by category or type, the sources containing 
potentially responsive information that it is neither searching nor 
producing.”17  This identification “should, to the extent possible, provide 
enough detail to enable the requesting party to evaluate the burdens and 
costs of providing the discovery and the likelihood of finding responsive 
information on the identified sources.”18 
  
[7] Assuming that the responding party provides the required 
identification of information sources to the requesting party, the parties 
can then try to resolve whether the production of that information should 
proceed and, if so, in what manner.19  The Rule establishes a procedure for 
the resolution of any dispute stating that,  “[o]n motion to compel 
discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is 
sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible 
                                                 
16
 See May 2005 Memorandum, supra note 15.  There, the Civil Rules Committee 
explained: 
[M]ore easily accessed sources – whether computer-based, paper, or 
human – may yield all the information that is reasonably useful for the 
action.  Lawyers sophisticated in these problems are developing a two-
tier practice in which they first sort through the information that can be 
provided from easily accessed sources and then determine whether it is 
necessary to search the difficult-to-access sources. 
Id. at 34. See also id. at 12 (expressing the same conclusion). 
17
 Committee Note, supra note 1, at 14. 
18
 Id. 
19
 Another provision of the recent electronic discovery amendments is an amendment to 
Rule 34, which incorporates the term “electronically stored information” into the list of 
information that can be the subject of a document request.  FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a).  As 
amended, Rule 34(b) also establishes a procedure for the identification of the form in 
which such information will be produced.  FED R. CIV. P. 34(b)(i)-(iii);  see Thomas Y. 
Allman, The Impact of the Proposed E-discovery Rules, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. (2006), 
http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v12i4/article13.pdf. 
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because of undue burden or cost.”20  As the text makes clear, the burden of 
proof is on the non-producing party to demonstrate that the requested 
information is not reasonably accessible.21 
 
[8] If the non-producing party establishes that point, then the burden shifts 
to the requesting party to establish “good cause” for the discovery. “If that 
showing is made, the court may nonetheless order discovery from such 
sources if the requesting party shows good cause, considering the 
limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C).”22  That reference incorporates pre-
existing limits on discovery in Rule 26(b)(2), for example, a court may 
limit “the frequency or extent of use” of discovery methods permitted 
under the Rules if it determines that:  
 
(1) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or 
duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is 
more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (2) 
the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by 
discovery in the action to obtain the information sought, or 
(3) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery 
outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs 
of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ 
resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the 
litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in 
resolving the issues.23  
 
                                                 
20
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
21
 The Rule does not address a party’s duty to preserve potentially responsive information 
from sources of information that are not reasonably accessible.  The Committee Note 
cautions, however: 
A party’s identification of sources of electronically stored information 
as not reasonably accessible does not relieve the party of its common-
law or statutory duties to preserve evidence. Whether a responding 
party is required to preserve unsearched sources of potentially 
responsive information that it believes are not reasonably accessible 
depends on the circumstances of each case. It is often useful for the 
parties to discuss this issue early in discovery. 
Committee Note, supra note 1, at 14. 
22
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
23
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 
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[9] The Committee Note provides guidance for the resolution of this issue, 
emphasizing that Rule 26(b)(2)(C) “balance[s] the costs and potential 
benefits of discovery.”24  The Committee Note explains that whether a 
court will require a responding party to search and produce information 
that is not reasonably accessible “depends not only on the burdens and 
costs of doing so, but also on whether those burdens and costs can be 
justified in the circumstances of the case.”25  The “[a]ppropriate 
considerations” may include: 
 
(i) the specificity of the discovery request; (ii) the quantity 
of information available from other and more easily 
accessed sources; (iii) the failure to produce relevant 
information that seems likely to have existed but is no 
longer available on more easily accessed sources; (iv) the 
likelihood of finding relevant, responsive information that 
cannot be obtained from other, more easily accessed 
sources; (v) predictions as to the importance and usefulness 
of the further information; (vi) the importance of the issues 
at stake in the litigation; and (vii) the parties’ resources.26 
 
[10] As noted above, Rule 26(b)(2)(B) describes two ways in which a 
dispute over the challenged discovery may be resolved: by a motion to 
compel the discovery, filed by the requesting party, or by a motion for a 
protective order, filed by the nonproducing party.27  As is the case with 
other discovery disputes under the Rules, the parties must confer before 
filing either motion.28  Although the Rule clearly describes the respective 
burdens of proof for resolution of this issue and identifies the applicable 
                                                 
24
 Committee Note, supra note 1, at 16.  
25
 Id. 
26
 Id. 
27
 A controversy over the implementation of the two-tier system could arise, however, in 
the context of sanctions proceeding under Rule 37.  If, for example, a party produces 
evidence for its affirmative case from a source of information that it previously identified 
as not reasonably accessible, it is foreseeable that the other party could assert that the 
information should be excluded. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c). 
28
 Committee Note, supra note 1, at 14-15 (“The parties should discuss the burdens and 
costs of accessing and retrieving the information, the needs that may establish good cause 
for requiring all or part of the requested discovery even if the information sought is not 
reasonably accessible, and conditions on obtaining and producing the information that 
may be appropriate.”). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIII, Issue 3 
 
 8 
motions practice, the Rule, as implemented, may involve additional 
proceedings.  The Committee Note explains that “[t]he requesting party 
may need discovery to test th[e] assertion” by the responding party that 
specific sources of information are not reasonably accessible.29  The 
Committee Note adds that “[s]uch discovery might take the form of 
requiring the responding party to conduct a sampling of information 
contained on the sources identified as not reasonably accessible; allowing 
some form of inspection of such sources; or taking depositions of 
witnesses knowledgeable about the responding party’s information 
systems.”30 
  
[11] In addition to the potential for discovery to resolve the accessibility 
dispute, the Rule contemplates that there may be discovery relevant to the 
question of whether “good cause” would support the challenged 
information demand.  The Committee Note acknowledges that in some 
cases the parties’ dispute can be resolved “through a single proceeding or 
presentation,” but that will not be universally true.31 The Committee 
describes such possible situations: 
 
The good-cause determination, however, may be 
complicated because the court and parties may know little 
about what information the sources identified as not 
reasonably accessible might contain, whether it is relevant, 
or how valuable it may be to the litigation.  In such cases, 
the parties may need some focused discovery, which may 
include sampling of the sources, to learn more about what 
burdens and costs are involved in accessing the 
information, what the information consists of, and how 
valuable it is for the litigation in light of information that 
can be obtained by exhausting other opportunities for 
discovery.32 
 
[12] Finally, if the requesting party demonstrates “good cause” for the 
production of the information, the court may “specify conditions for the 
                                                 
29
 Id. 
30
 Id. 
31
 Committee Note, supra note 1, at 16.  
32
 Id. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIII, Issue 3 
 
 9 
discovery.”  The Rule does not specify those “conditions,” but the 
Committee Note explains:   
 
The conditions may take the form of limits on the amount, 
type, or sources of information required to be accessed and 
produced. The conditions may also include payment by the 
requesting party of part or all of the reasonable costs of 
obtaining information from sources that are not reasonably 
accessible.  A requesting party’s willingness to share or 
bear the access costs may be weighed by the court in 
determining whether there is good cause.  But the 
producing party’s burdens in reviewing the information for 
relevance and privilege may weigh against permitting the 
requested discovery.33 
 
III.  RULE 26(B)(2)(B) IN OPERATION 
 
[13] Rule 26(b)(2)(B) must be considered in the context of the other 
electronic discovery amendments.  The sources of information to be 
searched will be among the topics discussed by counsel at their Rule 26(f) 
conferences, and will be a central issue in formal document requests under 
Rule 34. 
  
A.  THE PARTIES’ DUTY TO “MEET AND CONFER” 
  
[14] Under amended Rule 26(f), counsel for the parties will have to confer 
in order to devise a proposed discovery plan and to provide their views 
and proposals, inter alia, as to “any issues relating to disclosure or 
discovery of electronically stored information, including the form or forms 
in which it should be produced.”34  Accordingly, when a case involves the 
discovery of electronically stored information, the parties must address 
such issues, “depend[ing] on the nature and extent of the contemplated 
                                                 
33
 Id.  
34
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3).  The parties are to submit their proposals to the district court, 
which, under Rule 16(b), may enter a scheduling order that will include provisions for 
disclosure and discovery.  Rule 16(b) has been amended to provide that the order may 
include “provisions for disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information.”  
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b). 
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discovery and of the parties’ information systems.”35  The Committee 
Note explains that “[i]t may be important for the parties to discuss those 
systems, and accordingly important for counsel to become familiar with 
those systems before the conference. With that information, the parties can 
develop a discovery plan that takes into account the capabilities of their 
computer systems.”36   
 
[15] Rule 26(f) also contemplates that the parties will do more than simply 
exchange information about their information systems at the “meet and 
confer” session.37  For example, the Committee Note explains that “the 
parties may specify the topics for such discovery and the time period for 
which discovery will be sought.  They may identify the various sources of 
such information within a party’s control that should be searched for 
electronically stored information.”38  With specific reference to Rule 
26(b)(2)(B), the Committee Note adds that the parties should discuss 
“whether the information is reasonably accessible to the party that has it, 
including the burden or cost of retrieving and reviewing the 
information.”39  
  
[16] The threshold question for practitioners is whether they will be able 
to conduct an educated exchange of detailed information and views on 
whether, and under what conditions, they will provide access to specific 
sources of electronically stored information.  The effective operation of 
both Rule 26(f) and 26(b)(2)(B) assumes that counsel will be able to speak 
knowledgeably about their client’s respective information systems, 
including the system’s operations and limitations.  If that investigation has 
been thorough, the parties may be in a position to discuss which sources of 
electronically stored information may be reasonably accessible – and, as 
importantly, which may not be reasonably accessible.40  At the very 
                                                 
35
 Committee Note, supra note 1, at 21.  
36
 Id. The Committee Note adds that “[i]n appropriate cases identification of, and early 
discovery from, individuals with special knowledge of a party’s computer systems may 
be helpful.”  Id. 
37
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f). 
38
 Id. 
39
 Id. 
40
 The Committee Note implicitly recognizes that it may be unrealistic to expect that the 
“meet and confer” process will resolve the issues addressed in Rule 26(b)(2)(B).  The 
Note simply states that the parties “may identify” the various sources of information in a 
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beginning of the litigation process, however, counsel may lack 
comprehensive knowledge of the clients’ information systems and, 
therefore, counsel may not be in a position to commit itself to a position 
on what sources of information should be searched.41      
 
B.  DISCLOSURE UNDER RULE 26(A)(1); DISCOVERY UNDER RULE 34 
 
[17] The parties also will have to address how the two-tier discovery 
provisions of Rule 26(b)(2)(B) will be incorporated into the overall 
discovery process. First, under Rule 26(a)(1)(B), the parties have a duty of 
making an initial disclosure.  They must provide the other party with “a 
copy of, or a description by category and location of, all documents, 
electronically stored information, and tangible things that are in the 
possession, custody or control of the party and that the disclosing party 
may use to support its claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment.”  
Because each party must identify the electronically stored information that 
it may use in support of its claims or defenses, counsel may need to 
address early in the process what sources of information will be 
reasonably accessible in order for it to make that disclosure.42 
  
[18] When formal discovery begins, resolving the issue of what sources of 
information are reasonably accessible takes on critical importance.  If the 
parties were not able to resolve this issue during the Rule 26(f) process, a 
                                                                                                                         
party’s control that should be searched, and that the parties “may discuss whether the 
information is readily accessible to the party that has it.” Committee Note, supra note 1, 
at 21 (emphasis added). 
41
 An additional agenda item for the counsels’ meeting is whether they wish to enter into 
an agreement concerning the assertion of privilege or work product protection in 
conjunction with the exchange of information during discovery.  Such an agreement can 
be incorporated into the court’s Rule 16(b) scheduling order.  FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b).  New 
Rule 26(b)(5) establishes a procedure under which a party can make such an assertion 
after allegedly privileged information has been disclosed.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B).  
The negotiation of an agreement for presentation to the court may consume considerable 
time and resources, but a court-approved agreement, memorialized in a protective order, 
may be of assistance to the parties if there is a dispute as to whether an applicable 
privilege has been waived due to the disclosure of the information.  See Hopson v. City of 
Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 239-40 (D. Md. 2005) (describing the importance of the 
parties’ agreement being memorialized into a court order). 
42
 The initial disclosures must be made at, or within, fourteen days after the parties’ Rule 
26(f) meeting, “unless a different time is set by stipulation or court order,” or unless the 
party states an objection to such disclosures.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1). 
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party’s Rule 34 requests likely will accelerate that resolution if only by 
court intervention.  Rule 34 requests may elicit the objection that some 
sources of information should not be searched or produced because they 
are not reasonably accessible.43  The parties’ disagreements on 
accessibility may lead to discovery.44   The requesting party might issue a 
deposition under Rule 30(b)(6) directing the responding party to identify 
deponents knowledgeable about the relevant information systems, in order 
to probe the basis for the objection that the sources of information are not 
reasonably accessible.  In the alternative, counsel for the requesting party 
may issue a more targeted Rule 34 request, directed at requiring a sample 
of information from those sources.   
 
[19] Finally, some parties may reach an impasse over whether the 
identified second tier sources need to be searched or even on the scope of 
first tier discovery.  The rule may create situations in which some 
discovery is proceeding while the parties are at odds over other discovery.  
Such situations are the inevitable by-product of a rule that tries to balance 
the competing interests of the two adverse parties.    
   
IV.  HOW PRACTITIONERS SHOULD USE THE RULE 
 
[20] Rule 26(b)(2)(B) is part of an ambitious package of rules directed at 
assisting litigants (and judges) in addressing the challenges of electronic 
discovery.  To some practitioners, the two-tier system of discovery may be 
totally unfamiliar in its language and expected operation.45  How the 
“Rule” will operate in practice inevitably will be the function of give-and-
take in the parties’ formulation of their specific discovery plans and their 
objections to those of the opposing party.  Until a substantial body of case 
law develops that gives specific guidance to practitioners,46 counsel will 
                                                 
43
 Committee Note, supra note 1, at 14. 
44
 Id. at 15. 
45
 But cf. May 2005 Memorandum, supra note 15, at 34 (stating that practitioners already 
manage discovery with a two-tier system of accessibility in mind).   
46
 A few courts have cited the new Rule in the context of resolving a discovery dispute, 
requiring a party to permit the mirror imaging of its computer equipment.  Ameriwood 
Indus., Inc. v. Liberman, No. 4:06CV524-DJS, 2006 WL 3825291, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 
27, 2006); Cenveo Corp v. Slater, C.A., No. 06-CV-2632, 2007 WL 442387, *1 (E.D. Pa. 
Jan. 31, 2007) (citing that Rule in permitting the mirror imaging of hard drives); DE 
Technologies, Inc. v. Dell, Inc., No. Civ.A.704CV00628, 2007 WL 128966, *2 (W.D. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIII, Issue 3 
 
 13 
have to apply the Rule against the backdrop of existing case law on 
weighing the burdens of discovery against the potential benefits of the 
requested information to the parties’ claims or defenses in the litigation.47  
Nevertheless, practitioners will be able to work effectively to advance 
their clients’ interests if they apply the Rule and the guidance in its 
Committee Note in a systematic fashion. 
  
A.  THE ROLE OF THE “MEET AND CONFER” SESSIONS 
   
[21] For the two-tier system to operate effectively, counsel for each side 
first will need to undertake a careful evaluation of their respective client’s 
information systems.   At the early stage of litigation, the first priority for 
counsel will be to become conversant about those systems.  In that way, 
counsel can exchange detailed information about such systems at the Rule 
26(f) conferences. Given the extensive agenda of issues for discussion at 
the conferences, counsel may try to determine what sources of information 
will be reasonably accessible.48  The subsequent “meet and confer” 
session will be productive to the extent that counsel can master that task.49  
  
                                                                                                                         
Va. Jan 12, 2007) (stating that the new Rules “provide instructions” in resolving a dispute 
over the form of production of specific documents).  
47
 Courts already recognize that Rule 26(b)(2) “imposes general limitations on the scope 
of discovery in the form of a ‘proportionality test.’” Ferguson v. Lion Holdings, Inc., No. 
02Civ.4258(PKL)(JCF), 2005 WL 1216300, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2005) (quoting 
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  See, e.g., 
Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp., 223 F.R.D. 162, 167-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(quoting Zubulake  217 F.R.D. at 316); Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Sci. 
Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594, 600 (E.D. Wis. 2004); Robin Singh Ed. Serv., Inc. v. Excel Test 
Prep, No. C-03-5039 JSW(JCS), 2004 WL 2554454, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2004).  
Other courts have used what has been described as “marginal utility” analysis.  McPeek 
v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001) [hereinafter McPeek I]. 
48
 Amended Rule 26(f) requires the parties to confer on “any issues relating to disclosure 
or discovery of electronically stored information, including the form or forms in which it 
should be produced,” and “any issues relating to claims of privilege or protection as trial-
preparation material, including – if the parties agree on a procedure to assert such claims 
after production – whether to ask the court to include their agreement in an order.”  FED. 
R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)-(4).   
49
 Counsel’s knowledge of a party’s information systems presumably will improve over 
time, particularly if the party encounters litigation implicating its information systems 
frequently. 
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[22] Although the parties may expect that such investigatory work has 
been done before they initiate formal discovery requests – such as Rule 34 
production requests or Rule 33 interrogatories – the reality may be 
otherwise.  Ascertaining and understanding a client’s information systems 
will be an ongoing process.  Optimally, the parties may be in a position to 
exchange some of this knowledge during the Rule 26(f) “meet and confer” 
sessions, but those sessions may need to focus on more immediate issues.   
  
[23] There will be substantial pressure to resolve, as early as feasible, what 
sources of electronically stored information definitely will be produced 
and on what time table.   There also will be pressure for counsel to know, 
or at least have a solid estimate, as to what sources will not be reasonably 
accessible and, therefore, presumptively off-limits for discovery.  For that 
reason, counsel for a producing party will need to have conducted some 
inventory of the range of the client’s information systems to know what 
sources of information fit respectively in the first tier or second tier.  
Making a mistake in either direction may have significant ramifications.  
For example, if counsel represents to the opposing party that specific 
sources are accessible, but learns from more investigation that the cited 
sources are not accessible, there will be considerable embarrassment.  
Similarly, to the extent that counsel misstates that certain sources are not 
reasonably accessible, but later learns that, in fact, those sources are 
reasonably accessible, the misrepresentations will compromise counsel’s 
credibility and lead to mistrust in the discovery process.  Given the 
potential for misinformation and misunderstanding, counsel for the non-
producing party will need to be as thorough as possible in his or her 
investigation of the client’s information systems prior to making 
representations. 
  
B.  FRAMING THE DISPUTE OVER REASONABLE ACCESSIBILITY 
  
[24] The parties may be unsuccessful in resolving the question of what 
sources of information are reasonably accessible – they will disagree as to 
the categorization of such sources into the respective two tiers. At that 
point, there may be several means to resolve the dispute.  First, if the 
responding party has identified the sources of information that it has 
determined are not reasonably accessible, it may decide to rest on that 
assertion and await action by the requesting party to challenge its position.  
At that point, the requesting party may seek discovery to test the non-
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producing party’s assertion that specific sources of information are not 
reasonably accessible or may move to compel production of the 
information itself.   
 
[25] Second, the responding party may decide to be pro-active and file its 
motion for a protective order.   Filing that motion means that the party has 
decided, based on sufficient investigation, that it has sound, reasonable 
objections to being forced to access the sources of information that are at 
issue.  If the non-producing party has heeded the admonition in the 
Committee Note, it already has offered the requesting party information 
from the sources that it has identified as reasonably accessible.   The non-
producing party, hopefully, will have urged the requesting party to fully 
explore those sources for relevant information before demanding 
information from other sources.    
  
[26] Motions practice, however, will be inevitable if the requesting party 
contends that the information it seeks will not be derived from the 
reasonably accessible sources of information.  The requesting party also 
may argue that the information it expects to discover, even if it can be 
derived only from sources that are not reasonably accessible nevertheless 
should be produced. It will contend that the benefit of securing that 
information outweighs the burden or cost of production. 
  
[27] The prospect of discovery will introduce complexity into the 
resolution of this issue.   Discovery may be targeted at whether the sources 
of information are reasonably accessible or may involve a more intensive 
inquiry into the potential sampling of the underlying information.50  
Thorough preparation of information technology or records management 
personnel will be indispensable to the resolution of these issues.  If 
depositions are to occur, both parties should try to make them as efficient 
and effective as possible.   With that in mind, the inquiry into whether 
sources of information are (or are not) reasonably accessible, and the 
inquiry into the nature of the information sources themselves should 
                                                 
50
 See generally Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Ace Am. Reinsurs. Co., No. 05 Civ. 9170 RMB 
JCF, 2006 WL 3771090 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2006) (permitting sampling of claims files on 
computer system, and deposition of an individual knowledgeable about that system); J.C. 
Assocs. v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co., No. 01-2437(RJL/JMF), 2006 WL 1445173, at *1-2 
(D.D.C. May 25, 2006) (permitting sampling of claim and litigation files). 
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proceed through a single round of depositions of the officials with 
knowledge of these topics. 
  
[28] The potential for misunderstanding in the implementation of this rule 
already has engendered criticism; several commentators contend that the 
rule will be subject to abuse.51  For example, one commentator has stated 
that the rule “gives parties the ability to determine data’s accessibility and, 
therefore, their own production responsibilities.”52   Noting that Rule 
26(b)(2)(B) does not adequately define the term “not reasonably 
accessible,” the commentator asserts that “parties can easily claim that 
their data is not accessible for technical or monetary reasons.”53  The 
concern is that the non-producing party may be bluffing in claiming that 
accessing specific data would be “too costly or burdensome.”54 
  
[29] This criticism of the Rule is understandable, insofar as the Rule does 
not attempt to define which information systems are reasonably accessible, 
but the concern may be resolved in practice once the rule is implemented.   
First, because the Rule places the initial burden of proof on the non-
producing party to justify why it does not intend to produce information 
from sources that it determines to be not reasonably accessible, that party 
will have to corroborate its contentions with affidavits or declarations.  
                                                 
51
 Rebecca Rockwood, Comment, Shifting Burdens and Concealing Electronic Evidence: 
Discovery in the Digital Era, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 16, ¶ 29 (2006), 
http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v12i4/article16/pdf; Daniel B. Garrie et al., Comment, 
Hiding the Inaccessible Truth: Amending the Federal Rules to Accommodate Electronic 
Discovery, 25 REV. LITIG. 115, 121 (2006); Hon. Ronald J. Hedges, A View from the 
Bench and the Trenches: A Critical Appraisal of Some Proposed Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 227 FEDERAL RULES DECISIONS 123, 129 (May 2005) 
(characterizing the then-proposed amendment as “simply unnecessary”);  but see Thomas 
Y. Allman, The Impact of the Proposed E-discovery Rules, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 13, ¶ 6 
(2006) http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v12i4/article13.pdf (describing the Rule as “an 
innovative and practical resolution to the concerns identified in the Public Hearings [held 
by the Advisory Committee] about e-discovery.”).  
52
 Rockwood, supra note 51, at ¶ 29.  
53
 Rockwood, supra note 51, at ¶30.  This commentator cites Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 
217 F.R.D.309, 318-20 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), in which the district court identified five 
categories of data storage systems, of which two were considered inaccessible, but the 
commentator argues that “even data stored in the so-called accessible categories may be 
considered inaccessible because of undue burden or cost.”  Rockwood, supra note 51, at 
¶30. 
54
 Id. at ¶29. 
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Counsel will need such support from information technology or records 
management specialists, who will have to describe in detail the various 
information systems at issue.  Accordingly, counsel’s simple assertion that 
sources of information are not reasonably accessible will be insufficient.  
Its affidavits or declarations will have to thoroughly describe the 
information systems and sources, and their limitations.  To the extent that 
they do not do so, the party seeking access to the information should 
prevail. 
  
[30] In that respect, this new Rule does not differ substantially from the 
manner in which comparable discovery disputes must be resolved under 
existing law.  The party opposing discovery has the burden of proof to 
show, for example, why discovery would be unduly burdensome.55   
Under Rule 26(c), a party must establish good cause for the issuance of a 
protective order against discovery.56   
  
[31] A related criticism is that the non-producing party may fail to disclose 
specific sources of information.57   The Committee was aware of this 
criticism when it developed the Rule.  As it explained to the Standing 
Committee, however, self-designation of sources of information already is 
a facet of existing discovery practice.58  Moreover, as one commentator 
                                                 
55
 E.g., Peskoff v. Faber, Civ.A. No. 04-526 (HHK/JMF), 2007 WL 530096, at *4 
(D.D.C. Feb. 21, 2006); Thompson v. U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Devel., 219 
F.R.D. 93, 98 (D. Md. 2003) (“Conclusory or factually unsupported assertions by counsel 
that the discovery of electronic materials should be denied because of burden or expense 
can be expected to fail.”). 
56
 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2035 (2d ed.1994). 
57
 Rockwood, supra note 51, at ¶ 31 (“If a producing party fails to disclose the existence 
of certain documents, a discovering party will not know they exist, making it hard to 
show good cause to compel production”).  See Garrie et al, supra note 51, at 126 (arguing 
that “it is foreseeable that in specific situations where certain electronic documents are 
especially incriminating, litigants may be able to mischaracterize, re-characterize, or 
refrain from disclosing the existence of their data, thereby making it difficult, if not 
impossible, for requesting parties to obtain desired information.”). 
58
  All party-managed discovery and privilege invocation rests on “self-
designation” to some extent.  That is happening now, without the 
insights for the requesting party that the identification requirement 
provides.  The responding party must disclose categories and types of 
sources of potentially responsive information that are not searched, 
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has observed, “[t]he silver lining for the critics of this rule is that 
responding parties will be required to identify the sources of electronically 
stored information that they are not considering to be within the scope of 
discovery because they are not reasonably accessible,” which is preferable 
to “informal practice” under which requesting parties “were left to guess” 
about the issue or conduct “costly ancillary discovery to get a complete 
picture of the electronic discovery landscape.”59   
 
[32] A third criticism of the Rule is that it could lead organizations to re-
design their sources of information to make them less accessible and 
thereby frustrate discovery efforts.60  There are two responses to this 
concern.  First, discovery could determine if a party had altered the 
operation of its information systems during the relevant time period.  If 
that had occurred, presumably the requesting party could argue that issue 
to the court, and seek appropriate sanctions.  Second, there are ample 
grounds to question whether the criticism has any substantial empirical 
foundation.  The Committee took specific note of this concern: 
   
[M]any witnesses and comments rejected the argument that 
the rule would encourage entities or individuals to “bury” 
information that is necessary or useful for business 
purposesor that regulations or statutes require them to 
retain.  Moreover, the rule requires that the information 
identified as not reasonably accessible must be difficult to 
access by the producing party for all purposes, not for a 
particular litigation.  A party that makes information 
“inaccessible” because it is likely to be discoverable in 
                                                                                                                         
enabling the requesting party to decide whether to challenge the 
designation. 
Committee Report, supra note 1, at 36.  See Phoenix Four, Inc. v. Strategic Res. Corp., 
No. 05 Civ. 4837(HB) 2006 WL 1409413, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2006) (citing the 
Committee Note as “reinforc[ing] the concept that a party must identify even those 
sources that are ‘not reasonably accessible,’ but exempts the party from having to provide 
discovery unless its adversary moves to compel discovery.”). 
59
 Kenneth J. Withers, Electronically Stored Information: The December 2006 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 7 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 21 (2006). 
60See Rockwood, supra note 51, at ¶ 17; see Garrie et al, supra note 51, at 124; see 
Hedges supra, note 51, at 129. 
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litigation is subject to sanctions now and would still be 
subject to sanctions under the proposed rule changes.61 
 
[33] Finally, the requesting party can argue that if a party has made 
sources of information less accessible in response to pending or 
anticipated litigation, then that party should not be able to argue that the 
information source is not reasonably accessible within the meaning of the 
Rule.62 
 
C.  FRAMING THE “GOOD CAUSE” ISSUE 
  
[34] The Rule contemplates that a party will obtain discovery from 
sources of electronically stored information that are not reasonably 
accessible if it can establish good cause, subject to the limitations of Rule 
26(b)(2)(C).  The challenge for the requesting party will be how to 
demonstrate good cause, for example, why its demands are not 
“unreasonably duplicative or cumulative,” and why the discovery is not 
obtainable from another source that is “more convenient, less burdensome, 
or less expensive.”63  The other factors in the Rule must be addressed, to 
resolve the critical question of whether “the burden of expense of the 
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit . . .” under Rule 
26(b)(2)(C)(iii).64  
  
[35] How should the requesting party marshal the facts and law so that it 
can “justify the burdens and costs” that it would ask the court to impose on 
the producing party?  How can the responding party rebut these arguments 
                                                 
61
 May 2005 Memorandum, supra note 15, at 36-37.  See Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 
No. 04-1245-MLB-DWB, 2006 WL 3913444, at *3, (D. Kan. Nov. 15, 2006) (citing the 
Committee Note but observing that the storage media at issue was “reasonably related to 
the purposes for which the information is maintained. . . .”). 
62
 See Quinby v. WestLB AG, No. 04Civ.7406(WHP)(HBP), 2006 WL 2597900, at *9 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2006) (rejecting a defendant’s claim that the costs of restoring and 
searching e-mails that had been converted to a less accessible format should be shifted to 
the plaintiff-requester), amended, No. 04 Civ. 7406(WHP)(HB), 2007 WL 38230 
(S.D.N.Y Jan. 4, 2007). 
63
 A third factor is whether the requesting party has had “ample opportunity” by 
discovery to seek the information at issue.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(ii).  Presumably, 
the requesting party will be able to argue that it has not had that “ample opportunity” 
because the information was not available from the “tier one” discovery sources. 
64
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). 
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effectively, and thereby avoid the burdens and costs of being required to 
do a search of the second tier sources of information?  How can the parties 
assist the court in deciding whether the benefits of the discovery are likely 
to outweigh its expected burdens and costs? 
  
[36] The factors identified in the Committee Note provide helpful 
guidance.65 Several of them address the discovery conducted to date, for 
example, the nature and extent of the first tier discovery.  Counsel for both 
parties will need to inventory what information sources were actually 
searched from the first tier.  A court will want specifics on “the quantity of 
information available from other and more easily accessed sources.”66  
Counsel for the requesting party will want to be conversant with what 
relevant information the first tier of discovery yielded.   The quality of that 
information will have to be assessed as well to support the requesting 
party’s position that other information sources must be searched. 
  
[37] The responding party can defend its position effectively if it has been 
careful and comprehensive in its previous responses to the first tier of 
discovery.  Counsel will need to document how it has provided 
information from the reasonably accessible sources.67  The more 
comprehensive the showing, the more reasonable a counsel’s position will 
be that second tier sources should not be searched.  Counsel for the 
responding party also should determine what information sources no 
longer exist, what kind of information was stored on them, and whether 
that information has migrated to other systems.  That will be important 
because the court will evaluate “the failure to produce relevant 
information that seems likely to have existed but is no longer available on 
more easily accessed sources.”68   
  
[38] Both parties, relying on the information they have from the first tier 
discovery, also will have to develop their positions on “the likelihood of 
finding relevant, responsive information that cannot be obtained from 
                                                 
65
 See May 2005 Memorandum, supra note 15, at 41. These factors overlap with the 
factors enumerated in Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).  Counsel may want to develop a “checklist” 
of these issues to guide its progress through discovery in anticipation of the “good cause” 
dispute. 
66
 Id. 
67
 Committee Note, supra note 1, at 16.  
68
 Id.  
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other, more easily accessed sources.”69  This may involve discovery into 
the party’s information systems to understand the full ambit of potential 
information sources.  Finally, the parties will have to make “predictions as 
to the importance and usefulness of the further information,” and submit 
their views on “the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation.”70   
This will require the parties to articulate the context of the discovery at 
issue in the overall framework of their legal claims or defenses. 
 
[39] Existing case law will be of considerable assistance in resolving these 
disputes.  Courts, if given enough information about the information 
sources at issue, can use the Rule 26(b)(2) factors to resolve these 
disputes.71  When, for example, the issue is whether relevant information 
might be stored on a specific information source, the court can weigh the 
likelihood of such information being located and contrast the expected 
yield of that new relevant information against the information the party 
already has obtained in discovery.72  Courts have developed experience in 
evaluating the burdens imposed on a producing party to locate and retrieve 
information from electronic sources – where the producing party can 
demonstrate substantial burdens in connection with such location and 
retrieval, the requesting party must be able to demonstrate that there will 
be tangible benefits from access to that information and must be able to 
show how the requested information will be important to the resolution of 
the issues in the case.73 
                                                 
69
 Id. 
70
 Id.  
71
 Thompson v. U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Devel. 219 F.R.D. 93, 98 (D. Md. 
2003) (“[I]t . . . can be argued with some force that the Rule 26(b)(2) balancing factors 
are all that is needed to allow a court to reach a fair result when considering the scope of 
discovery of electronic records.”).  
72
 In Convolve, Inc., v. Compaq Computer, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 162, 167, (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
At issue was plaintiff’s access to documents that might reflect specifically described disk 
drive information.  The court observed that requiring the defendant to disclose all such 
information “would require an expenditure of time and resources far out of proportion to 
the marginal value of the materials to this litigation,” and that “there has been no showing 
that it would go beyond the information already provided by [defendant] in summary 
form.” Id. at 65.  
73
 Jones v. Goord, No. 95 CIV. 8026(GEL), 2002 WL 1007614, *12-13  (S.D.N.Y. May 
16, 2002).  The court used the Rule 26(b)(2) factors to reject plaintiffs’ request for access 
to various electronic data bases maintained by state prison authorities, emphasizing both 
the difficulties of extracting information from the databases and plaintiffs’ failure to show 
that such access would advance plaintiffs’ case. 
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D.  IMPOSING OTHER CONDITIONS ON SECOND TIER DISCOVERY 
 
[40]  A final issue for counsel’s consideration is evaluating whether the 
second-tier discovery should proceed in some limited manner, or only 
under specific conditions.  The Committee Note suggests that, if the 
requesting party has shown “good cause,” discovery may proceed subject 
to “limits on the amount, type, or sources of information required to be 
accessed and produced” and that sharing of costs may be a condition 
imposed for access to the second tier of discovery.74   
 
[41] For the responding party, the prospect of limits on the discovery may 
sound attractive, but it will reasonably want those limits to be defined.  In 
contrast, the requesting party may be disinclined to abide by firm limits, at 
least until some preliminary discovery of the information source(s) has 
begun.  Once such limited discovery has occurred, whether by sampling or 
some other method, the parties will have to reevaluate their positions and 
decide on whether judicial intervention is still required.75  Sampling also 
                                                 
74
 Committee Note, supra note 1, at 17.  The Committee Note explains, however, that the 
burdens on the producing party may still warrant denial of the discovery.   Id.  See 
Withers, supra note 59, at 21 (“Accessibility is applied to determine the presumptive 
scope of discovery of electronically stored information.   
The fundamental principle is that if electronically stored information 
resides on a source that is not reasonably accessible, such that the 
relevance of the information to either the claims or defenses or the 
general subject matter of the litigation cannot be determined without 
incurring ‘undue’ costs and burdens, then that electronically stored 
information is presumptively outside the scope of discovery.” 
Id. (footnote omitted).  See Cognex Corp. v. Electro Scientific Indus., No. 
Civ.A. 01CV10287RCL, 2002 WL 32309413,*5  (D. Mass. July 2, 2002) 
(stating the willingness of requesting party to share or bear discovery costs did 
not outweigh the reasons against permitting the discovery). 
75
 See McPeek I, 202 F.R.D. at 34 (applying “marginal utility” principles, court 
authorized a “test run” of a backup restoration of e-mails attributable to identified agency 
employee);  McPeek v. Ashcroft, 212 F.R.D. 33, 35   (D.D.C. 2003) (McPeek II) 
(requiring restoration of an additional tape); THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES:  BEST PRACTICES 
RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT 
PRODUCTION, at 44 (2005), 
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/7_05TSP.pdf. But cf. Laura E. 
Ellsworth & Robert Pass, Cost Shifting in Electronic Discovery, 5 SEDONA CONF. J. 125, 
148  (Fall 2004) (“It seems likely that sampling will often yield simply inconclusive 
results – no ‘smoking gun,’ but a general indication that some additional discoverable, 
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implicates whether the parties will need to support their positions through 
the declarations or affidavits of information technology specialists or other 
experts, who may be able to provide opinions on the expected utility of the 
sampling, as well as the validity of the sampling methods.  The courts 
have had considerable experience with sampling and have shown a 
willingness to permit searches that are narrower than requested using more 
targeted search terms or narrowing the scope of the searches.76 
  
[42] A substantial issue in the world of electronic discovery will be the 
allocation of costs.77  The Committee Note emphasizes that a requesting 
party’s willingness to share or bear costs “may be weighed by the court,” 
but the “producing party’s burdens in reviewing the information for 
relevance and privilege may weigh against permitting the requested 
discovery.”78  The responding party, consistent with the Committee Note, 
will be wary of agreeing to cost-shifting unless the trade-off of money 
against time and effort is worthwhile.   The requesting party will have to 
assess its willingness to share (or bear) the costs of the information search 
and retrieval against its other litigation costs, as well as the potential 
benefit of securing useful information.  As with the other issues, decisions 
will have to be made based on some substantial amount of knowledge of 
the information sources and what data they will yield for review and 
analysis.   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
  
[43] Rule 26(b)(2)(B) has great potential to help parties focus and resolve 
their electronic discovery demands and responses.  But, as is the case with 
all discovery issues, the parties’ commitment to the process will determine 
how well the Rule will operate.  In the early stages of counsels’ exchange 
of information and views, reaching agreement on how the Rule will affect 
                                                                                                                         
but probably not highly probative, information exists on the media not yet restored and 
searched.”). 
76
 See Semsroth v. City of Wichita, No. 04-1245-MLB-DWB, 2006 WL 3913444, *10 
(D. Kan. Nov. 15, 2006) (permitting a search of employer’s backup tapes but limiting 
scope of search to specific search words and the identification of fifty out of 1,177 
identified mail boxes). 
77
 There is extensive literature on cost-shifting or cost-sharing in electronic discovery.  
See generally Ellsworth & Pass, supra, note 75 (citing the cases and commentary). 
78
 May 2005 Memorandum, supra note 15, at 42. 
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the parties’ discovery demands may be difficult.  Focusing on the 
resolution of discovery problems with first tier discovery may facilitate 
resolution of the Rule 26(b)(2)(B) balancing factors.  Although the parties 
may not emerge at the end of their discovery dispute with a complete 
victory on what information is accessed or denied access, at the very least, 
this Rule should assist the parties and the court in establishing a 
reasonable path through the electronic discovery process. 
 
